Listen to the audio pronunciation of Soon Ja Du on pronouncekiwi. The standard is the same for review of an order granting probation. PEOPLE of the State of California, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent. Utilizing this standard of review, we conclude that the respondent court's determination was not an abuse of discretion. Defendant was sentenced to ten years in state prison.

Determination that this was an unusual case. 9 ante ). A single criterion will rarely be determinative;  in most cases, the sentencing judge will have to balance favorable and unfavorable facts.”, 17. Defendant Soon Ja Du was convicted of voluntary manslaughter in the killing of Latasha Harlins, a customer in defendant's store. Copyright © 2020, Thomson Reuters. Defendant's husband testified that he had purchased the .38–caliber handgun from a friend in 1981 for self-protection. In other words, defendant got her break from the jury. GRIGNON, J., concurs in the result. Criminal Law often felt like an attack on my humanity. She was a good athlete and an active church member. Rule 410 provides that “General objectives of sentencing include:“(a) Protecting society.“(b) Punishing the defendant.“(c) Encouraging the defendant to lead a law abiding life in the future and deterring him from future offenses.“(d) Deterring others from criminal conduct by demonstrating its consequences.“(e) Preventing the defendant from committing new crimes by isolating him for the period of incarceration.“(f) Securing restitution for the victims of crime.“(g) Achieving uniformity in sentencing.“Because in some instances these objectives may suggest inconsistent dispositions, the sentencing judges shall consider which objectives are of primary importance in the particular case.“The sentencing judge should be guided by statutory statements of policy, the criteria of these rules, and the facts and circumstances of the case.”. Defendant testified that it was Latasha's statement, “What orange juice?” which changed defendant's attitude toward the situation, since prior to that time defendant was not afraid of Latasha. Abuse of discretion must be demonstrated based on the facts of the particular case being reviewed, and not on a statistical label.”  (People v. Preyer (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 568, 574, 210 Cal.Rptr. 8.37.) To the contrary, the court specifically acknowledged the applicability of this section:  “There is in this case, as counsel has stated quite correctly, a presumption against probation because a firearm was used, and as [the District Attorney] said, in order to overcome that presumption, the court must find this to be an unusual case as that term is defined by law.”   The court then commenced to apply the criteria set forth in rule 413. 8.40.) Latasha hit defendant in the eye with her fist twice. 16. In 1989, they purchased the Empire Liquor Market, despite being warned by friends that it was in a “bad area.”. Secondly, the defendant has no recent record, in fact, no record at all of committing similar crimes or crimes of violence. Defendant's son, Joseph Du, testified that there were at least 40 shoplifting incidents a week at the store. The jury found defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter and also found true special allegations that defendant personally used a firearm, within the meaning of Penal Code sections 1203.06(a)(1) and 12022.5. Although the orange juice was in the backpack, it was partially visible. (People v. Cazares (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 833, 837, 235 Cal.Rptr. Microsoft Edge. 5.

And he told me to be careful with those jackets sticking out.”   Latasha was wearing a sweater and a “Bruins” baseball cap. In determining whether or not a case is “unusual,” the court may consider “[a] fact or circumstance indicating that the basis for the statutory limitation on probation, although technically present, is not fully applicable to the case․”  (Cal.Rules of Court, rule 413(c)(1)(i).)

The District Attorney cannot meet his burden by taking the court's comments out of context and disregarding other language which does not support his position. [2] It is one of a number of Japanese-style names ending in "ja", like Young-ja and Jeong-ja, that were popular when Korea was under Japanese rule, but declined in popularity afterwards. Defendant's son, Joseph Du, described the situation as “having to conduct business in a war zone.”   In December 1990, defendant's son was robbed while working at the store and he incurred the wrath of local gang members when he agreed to testify against one of their number who he believed had committed the robbery.6  Soon thereafter, the family closed the store for two weeks while defendant's husband formulated a plan (which he later realized  was “naive”) to meet with gang members and achieve a form of truce. Defendant also testified that Latasha threatened to kill her. 8. After making the statement relied on by the District Attorney, the court went on to say:  “Did Mrs. Du react inappropriately to Latasha Harlins? By convicting defendant of voluntary manslaughter, the jury impliedly found that defendant had the intent to kill and that the killing was unlawful, i.e., that it was neither justifiable nor excusable. BOREN, J., concurs. 14. 20. 8.42, 8.43 and 8.44] and honest but unreasonable belief in self-defense [CALJIC No.
The court observed that the victim had “used her fists as weapons just seconds before the shooting” and commented that Latasha was not justified in her “assault on Mrs. Du.”. We recommend using The facts are taken from the evidence presented at trial, including the testimony of witnesses and a videotape of the incident which was in evidence at trial and which was submitted as an exhibit to the petition. Our function is to determine whether the respondent court's order is arbitrary or capricious, or “ ‘exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered.’ ”  (People v. Warner (1978) 20 Cal.3d 678, 683, 143 Cal.Rptr. Defendant testified that she was suspicious because she expected if the victim were going to pay for the orange juice, she would have had it in her hand. The respondent court's decision not to impose jail time in this case was within the guidelines set by the Legislature. We conclude, based on the record presented, that the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the statutory conditions for probation were satisfied in this case. Please try again.
For the first ten years of their residence in the United States, defendant worked in a garment factory and her husband worked as a repairman. Defendant was waiting on two customers at the counter when the victim, 15–year–old Latasha Harlins, entered the store. In determining that this was an “unusual case” which overcame the statutory presumption against probation, the court also found that “the defendant participated in the crime under circumstances of great provocation, coercion, and duress.”   We assume the court was relying upon California Rules of Court, rule 413(c)(2), which allows the court to consider “[a] fact or circumstance not amounting to a defense, but reducing the defendant's culpability for the offense․”  The District Attorney argues that the court improperly used this factor because the provocation in this case (i.e., the blows struck by Latasha) was successfully urged by defendant as a defense in the trial, as evidenced by the fact that the jury reduced the charge from second degree murder to voluntary manslaughter. That report reveals the following about defendant: At the time the report was prepared, defendant was a 51–year–old Korean-born naturalized American citizen, having arrived in the United States in 1976. Begin typing to search, use arrow keys to navigate, use enter to select. 3. They sold this store and purchased the one in Saugus. The court interpreted the jury's verdict to mean that the killing was unlawful and intentional, but was committed in the heat of passion.17  It is obvious that the point the court was making was that if there had been time for reflection the crime might not have occurred. 604.)